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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It is submitted that the present rule in these cases should be
altered. The adoption of a control test will work toward a desirable
end, particularly if liberally applied, but as indicated above, two
suits will still be required. The minority view, whereby the parent's
action is derived from the child's and must fall if the child fails,
would be an improvement, but it also sometimes requires two trials.
It is urged that the best solution is in a statutory revision to permit
joinder, giving all of the parties their day in court, while at the
same time eliminating a costly second trial.
PnILIp G. CARsoN
Taxation-Deductions of Rental Payments after Gift and Leaseback
to Short-Term Trust-Taxation of Income
Taxpayers may use the gift and leaseback device to effect tax
saving with greater confidence as a result of a recent decision of
the Tax Court of the United States.1 The gift and leaseback has
been popular among some taxpayers in high income brackets, chief-
ly physicians, as a method of reducing income taxes while boosting
total family income.2 Its popularity began to decline, however, when
the Tax Court held in I. L. Van Zandt3 that a noncorporate tax-
payer had to show a "business purpose" for making a gift of real
estate to a trust before he could validly deduct rental payments
made to the trust on leaseback of the property.4
1Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. No. 48 (July 6, 1965).
The popularity of the gift and leaseback is reflected by the amount of
litigation it has generated. Notable successes include Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v.
Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); Commissioner v. Greenspun,
156 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1946), on remand, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 509 (1948);
Alden B. Oakes, supra note 1.
40 T.C. 824 (1963), af'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
814 (1965), 86 Sup. Ct. 32 (1965).
'The court said:
Since deductions are matters of legislative grace and the taxpayer
has the burden of proving he is entitled to them, the petitioner here
must establish that the rental payments were in fact "ordinary and
necessary" expenses in his medical practice. While they may be
ordinary, were they necessary under these circumstances? We think
not. The petitioner owned and used the building and medical equip-
ment in his "trade or business" before he ever created the trusts,
transferred the property to the trusts, and then leased it back. Actual-
ly he continued to use the property in exactly the same manner he
had before these transactions were arranged and carried out. This
indicates a lack of any business purpose, which we believe is implicitly
required by section 162(a).
40 T.C. at 830-31. (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 44
GIFT AND LEASEBACK
The Tax Court repudiated the Van Zandt "business purpose"
test in the case of Alden B. Oakes,5 decided in July 1965, and
cleared the way to renewed interest in the use of the gift and lease-
back. The device has frequently been used in conjunction with a
short-term trust0 and was so used by taxpayers Van Zandt and
Oakes. The latter used it successfully while the former did not.
An illustration of a typical situation involving a short-term
trust and a gift and leaseback will be helpful in demonstrating
how the device works. The taxpayer establishes an irrevocable trust
with a term of at least ten years and a day' for the benefit of his
minor children, conveying real estate used in his business (the gift)
to the trust as its corpus. He then leases the same property from
the trust (the leaseback), being careful not to pay more than a
reasonable rental,' and deducts the rent payments as business ex-
penses." Upon the termination of the trust the property reverts to
the taxpayer, unless he has sold or otherwise disposed of his re-
versionary interest.
Assuming the taxpayer's rental deductions are larger than any
depreciation deductions he might have claimed if he had kept the
property,10 and assuming any gift tax on the transaction is less than
the potential saving of income tax,1 the taxpayer's reward from
using this device is a reduction of his taxes. In addition, he is
'44 T.C. No. 48 (July 6, 1965).
'As used in this note, a short-term trust is any trust of limited duration
that complies with all of the requirements of §§ 671-78 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, so that the income of the trust will not be taxed to
the grantor.
" The term must be longer than ten years in order to comply with § 673 (a)
of the Code.
'Reasonableness of the rental is one of the factors that determines the
deductibility of rent payments. See, e.g., Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225
F.2d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1955), where the court found a yearly rental of
$19,412.25 to be unreasonable when the same property had rented for $1,050
per year before the gift and leaseback, and denied the deductions on this
basis.
' Deductions are permitted by § 162(a) (3) of the Code for reasonable
rental payments that must be made for purposes of a trade or business.
10 "For a leaseback to be profitable tax-wise, property must either be
non-depreciable (real estate) or have a low basis, since rent deduction
through a leaseback arrangement is a substitute for depreciation." Cohen,
Transfers and Leasebacks to Trusts: Tax and Planning Considerations, 43
VA. L. REv. 31 (1957).11Under § 2521 of the Code a donor has a $30,000 lifetime exemption
from the gift tax, and under § 2503(b), he has an annual exclusion of $3,000
per donee provided such gift is not a "future interest." Moreover, the afore-
said amounts may be doubled by the donor by "splitting the gift" under
§ 2513 of the Code.
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indirectly rewarded through the benefit that his children receive
from the trust. A tax reduction for the family will result only if
the income is taxed to the trust or its beneficiaries at a rate lower
than that paid by the grantor on his income. The difference in the
tax at the lower rate and the tax at the higher rate accrues to the
benefit of the taxpayer's family as an economic unit and makes the
gift and leaseback device worthwhile for high bracket taxpayers. 2
While perhaps the most important advantage to be gained by
use of a gift and leaseback with a short-term trust is splitting of
income between a parent in a high tax bracket and children in lower
brackets, this is not the only advantage. 3 The device may be useful
for assuring education expenses for children, 4 assuring income for
aged relatives,' providing life insurance coverage on persons other
than the taxpayer,'" and for accomplishing many other purposes.
Its use is limited only by the ingenuity of the planner and pro-
visions of law.
A taxpayer must pay particular attention to two primary issues
if he is to use the gift-leaseback device successfully with a short-
term trust. These are (1) whether or not the rental payments to
the trust are deductible to the grantor, and (2) whether the trust
" For an illustration of how worthwhile it can be, see Yohlin, The Short-
Term Trust-A Respectable Tax-Saving Device, 14 TAX L. REv. 109, 110(1958)
F or a general idea of the many applications of the gift and leaseback
device with a short-term trust, see Drew, Paying Family Expenses and
Saving Taxes, 37 TAXES 689 (1959), and Yohlin, op. cit. supra note 12.
" In setting up a trust to assure education expenses for children, the
grantor must bear in mind that trust income applied or distributed for the
support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally obli-
gated to support or maintain will be taxable to the grantor under authority
of § 677(b). However, the measure of the parent's legal obligation is to be
found in local rather than federal law, Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1956),
and no cases have been found in which a state required a parent to furnish
a college or professional education for his child. Therefore, it is doubtful
that trust income used to defray a child's college expenses, other than room,
board and clothing, will be taxable to the parent.
"The principle of § 677(b) of the Code applies to support of parents
as well, and if the grantor is under a legal obligation to support them
under state law, trust income used for their support will be taxable to him.
Still, a trust for the benefit of parents can be a useful device when the
income is used only to supplement the parents' own funds.
"' Trust income used to buy insurance policies on the life of the grantor
will be taxed to the grantor. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933). See
generally Durant, Trust Income and the Payment of Premimns, 27 TAXES 904
(1949); Smith, Federal Taxation of Insurance Trusts, 40 MIcH. L. REV.
207 (1941). But trust income used to pay premiums on insurance covering
someone other than the grantor is not taxable to the grantor.
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income is taxable to the trust, to the beneficiary or to the grantor.
The gift and leaseback device will yield no tax saving if the rental
deductions are disallowed or if the trust income is found to be tax-
able to the grantor.
In determining the issue of deductibility of rental payments
under a gift and leaseback with a short-term trust, the courts have
chosen to look at several factors. Chief among these in the past
have been the extent of prearrangement of the leaseback,'17 the
independence of the trustee,' the revocability of the trust,' 9 and
the reasonableness of the rental payments.2"
The Van Zandt decision was the first application by the Tax
Court of a business purpose test to a gift and leaseback made by a
noncorporate taxpayer.2 ' In order to understand what misled the
court in applying the test, it is first necessary to examine the section
of the Internal Revenue Code under which the taxpayer claimed a
deduction for rental expenses. The deduction was claimed under
section 162(a) (3), which says:
(a) IN GENERAL-There shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a
condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of
the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has
not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.22
'
7 See Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095, 1101 (1949).
'" See Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir. 1950), revers-
ing 12 T.C. 1095 (1949).
See Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948).
20 See Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1955).
"In I. L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824, 830 (1963), while the court pur-
portedly acted under the authority of a line of decisions, a study of the
decisions it cited shows that a business purpose test was determinative of
only one other case involving a gift and leaseback. This case, White v.
Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), was criticized by a dissenting
judge as a mistaken application of the business purpose test. The test had
been applied in earlier cases involving a sale and leaseback, and two of
the four cases cited by the Van Zandt court were sale and leaseback rather
than gift and leaseback cases. W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188
F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951), affirining 12 T.C. 539 (1940); Unger v. Camp-
bell, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 547 (N.D. Tex. 1960). The court in the fourth
case found there was no gift because of lack of showing of a clear and
unequivocal intention to part with the property. Johnson v. Commissioner,
86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936), affirming 33 B.T.A. 1003 (1936).2" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (3).
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The Van Zandt court held the rental payments in that particular
gift and leaseback situation were not "necessary" within the mean-
ing of section 162 (a) (3) because the taxpayer had owned the prop-
erty before the transfer, and there was no compelling business reason
for him to give it to the trust; thus the rental was not "required
to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession" of the
property.23 The Oakes court said the test of business necessity re-
quired by section 162 (a) (3) should be made by viewing the situa-
tion as it exists after the gift is made, not before.24 It is clear
that if the court had not repudiated the Van Zandt test in Oakes,
the gift and leaseback would have become valueless as a device for
saving income taxes. To require the showing of a business purpose
for giving property to the trust is tantamount to an automatic dis-
allowance of the rental deduction. Rarely, if ever, is there a valid
business reason for making such a gift to a trust.
In abandoning the "business purpose" test of Van Zandt, the
Oakes court did not say why it was repudiating the earlier position.
The court may have had in mind a distinction explained in a recent
article by Professor Froehlich in the California Law Review.25 That
distinction is that a rational basis exists for applying such a "business
purpose" test to a gift and leaseback in the case of a corporation,
but does not exist in the case of an individual. The author ex-
plained that a corporation is by nature business motivated and
ordinarily does not make gifts. Therefore, where a corporation
transfers property to a related entity and then leases it back, it
" In affirming the case on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit said:
[I]t seems to us inevitably we must look at the original conveyance
of the property together with the execution of the leaseback as a single
transaction. Thus viewing it, we conclude that the obligation to pay
rent resulted not as an ordinary and necessary incident in the conduct
of the business, but was in fact created solely for the purpose of
permitting a division of the taxpayer's income tax.
341 F.2d at 443.
" The court said:
At that point, since Alden Oakes needed a building for practicing
medicine, he agreed to rent the property from the trustee for a reason-
able amount. Consequently, we believe there is a sound basis for
holding that the rent paid by Oakes was, in terms of section 162,
both "ordinary and necessary" and "required to be made as a condi-
tion to continued use ... of property."
44 T.C. at-
"Froehlich, Clifford Trusts: Use of Partnership Interests as Corpus:
Leaseback Arrangements, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 956, 973-74 (1964).
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would appear proper to look to the business reasons for the transfer
in determining deductibility of lease payments. Professor Froehlich
continued:
An individual, however, is governed by many non-business
influences, and it is recognized that all his transfers need not be
business motivated. He may, for instance, make outright gifts
of income producing assets. No one has ever challenged the right
of an individual to establish a ... [short-term] trust with stock
of a corporation, for instance. Similarly, there should be no prob-
lem created by a proprietor's transferring some of his business
assets to his child's trust. The fact that the transaction has no
business purpose has nothing to do with its bona fides-it is not
intended to have a business purpose.26
Another factor which has recently come to bear on the issue
of deductibility of rental payments made to a short-term trust is
the requirement in section 162 (a) (3) that the taxpayer have no
"equity" in the property he is renting. The section permits deduc-
tions only for property "to which the taxpayer has not taken or is
not taking title or in which he has no equity."
2 7
A few recent cases in, the gift and leaseback area have adopted
a broad, literal interpretation of this phrase and, as an alternative
basis for decision, have denied rental deductions because the lessee
had an "equity" in the property.28 What exactly is the prohibited
"equity," and what effect does it have on practical applications of
the gift and leaseback device in conjunction with a short-term
trust? The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has taken the posi-
tion that the "equity" is any equitable interest held by the taxpayer
in the rented property.29 This interpretation has a direct and adverse
Id. at 973.
27 See text accompanying note 22 supra. (Emphasis added.)
'See Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584, 588 (N.D.N.Y. 1962),
where the grantors retained the power to dispose of the corpus of the
trust and the court said "it would seem that the grantors had an equity
in the premises at least until the power of sale was exercised and for that
reason also the Commissioner was right in disallowing the deduction";
Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1955), where the
concurring opinion suggested that another ground for disallowance of the
deduction was that the grantor had an "equity" in the property because he
bought the property under a mortgage and gave it to the trust subject to
the mortgage, retaining an equity of redemption.
2 In discussing the Commissioner's contention that taxpayer Oakes had
retained the prohibited "equity," the Oakes court defined "equity" as a
"right of redemption, a reversionary interest, a right to specific performance,
or in general any right respecting property which traditionally would have
been enforceable by means of an equitable remedy." 44 T,C. at -.
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impact on the use of a short-term trust with a gift and leaseback,
as will be presently shown.
One of the primary reasons why the taxpayer chooses a short-
term trust as the tax-saving vehicle is the fact that it permits him
to regain control of the property after his purpose has been served ;30
i.e., in giving real estate to a trust for ten years, he retains a re-
versionary interest in the property, and upon the termination of the
trust at the end of the ten-year period the property reverts to him.
Thus, he is able to effect a tax saving during a temporary period
of family need-for instance, when his children need money for
college tuition and expenses-and he is restored to full ownership
rights in his property when the temporary need has been satisfied.
Is the reversionary interest retained by the settlor of the trust
an "equity" within the meaning of the rental deduction section of
the Code? If it is, then he may not deduct rental payments upon
leaseback. It is true that he can avoid this consequence by either
selling or giving away this reversionary interest. However, if he
does either of these he will not regain control of the property upon
termination of the trust, which amounts to a failure of his primary
consideration for choosing a short-term trust.
The Oakes decision approved by implication the Commissioner's
contention that rental deductions should be disallowed whenever the
lessee has any equitable interest in the property.3' However, neither
the Oakes case nor other decisions in the gift and leaseback area
that have dealt with the "equity" problem have met the issue head-
on. In Oakes the court found that the taxpayer had no equity in
the property because he had sold his reversionary interest to his
wife. 2 The court failed to consider the probability that Oakes re-
tained effective control over the reversionary interest in his wife's
hands. In the future, the court will likely take notice of this prob-
00 See Yohlin, op. cit. supra note 12.
0 44 T.C. at
"The court said:
One of the reasons why respondent asserts Alden Oakes did not
divest himself of sufficient control and ownership over the property
is that upon termination of the trust the property must be returned
to the grantors. This argument disregards two pertinent facts, viz.,
the pre-existing and continuing interest of the wife and the transfer
of the doctor's remainder interest to his wife. Surely, after April 28,
1959, Alden Oakes had neither a present nor a remainder interest
in the trust property. His wife alone was then left with the power to




ability and use it as a basis for denying deductions. In the other
cases the "equity" issue was not the sole basis for decision.8
Insofar as they are authority for the argument that deductions
should be refused whenever the taxpayer retains any type of equity
in the property, however, it is submitted that the cases are in error.
Such a broad interpretation of section 162 (a) (3) urged upon the
courts by the Commissioner is unwarranted. To follow the argu-
ment of the Commissioner to its logical conclusion would mean that
no person having a future interest in real estate could rent that real
estate from the holder of the present possessory interest and get the
benefit of a rental deduction, for if he had a future interest in the
property, he would have an equity.
The legislative history of the section offers no clue to the mean-
ing of "equity." 4 The only clue available is in a series of cases
dealing with leases containing purchase options.35 Here, the courts
have been concerned by the fact that the lessee has an equity in the
property-the option to purchase. Instead, they have looked to the
rental payments to see whether the payments are for "rent" or
whether they are for the "purchase" of the property. Deductions
have been allowed unless it was determined that each rental pay-
ment increased the ownership interest of the lessee-optionee.8 6 It is
submitted that these cases correctly interpret "equity" in the context
of this section in its colloquial usage as "ownership" rather than in
its legal usage, and that the purpose behind inclusion of the phrase
is to prevent persons from deducting as rental expense, money that
was really being applied toward purchase of the property.
Turning now to the problem of taxation of the income of the
trust, will the income be taxable to the trust, to the beneficiaries, or
to the grantor? The main concern of the grantor is that the income
not be taxed to him. Many of the problems connected with the
In Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1955), the court
held the rent payments nondeductible because they were not paid as a
condition to continued use of the property in the taxpayer's business, and
in Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), the court
disallowed the deductions because the taxpayers retained control over the
actions of the trustee.
", See H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) and S. REP. No.
793, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
3'5 See Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th
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taxation of the income of a short-term trust have been either solved
or simplified by the so-called "Clifford Trust" provisions of the
1954 Code,37 and if the grantor will carefully comply with their
requirements, he will be largely assured that the trust income will
not be taxed to him.
Tax consequences of a gift and leaseback are sufficiently pre-
dictable to permit use of the device for income-splitting among
family members. However, taxpayers should be wary in using the
device with a short-term trust so long as the possibility exists that
a reversionary interest held by the grantor in the trust corpus will
be found to be a prohibited equity under section 162(a) (3).
Until this issue is settled favorably, it would appear wise to make
a gift of the entire fee to the trust, to sell the reversionary interest,
or to give the remainder interest to another beneficiary who is not
so related to the taxpayer as to raise an issue of his possible con-
tinued control over the property.
THOMAS J. BOLCH
Taxation-Strike Benefits as Income
The Internal Revenue Code excludes from gross income "the
value of property acquired by gift."' Although similar language
was contained in the first income tax statute2 following enactment
of the sixteenth amendment and in all subsequent revenue acts,3
"' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78. The name "Clifford" comes from
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), the landmark case requiring
the settlor to pay tax on the income of a short-term trust where he retained
substantial elements of control over the trust corpus and income. This case
caused a great amount of uncertainty and resulted in the promulgation by
the Treasury of the Clifford Regulations, which set up a series of clear
tests defining the situations in which the income of a trust would be taxable
to the grantor. These regulations were put into the Code itself in 1954.
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a).
' Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 167, provided that gross
income shall not include "the value of property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or descent."
' Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 4, 39 Stat. 758; War Revenue Act of
1917, ch. 63, § 1200, 40 Stat. 329; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b) (3),
40 Stat. 1065; Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 213(b) (3), 42 Stat. 238;
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 213(b) (3), 43 Stat. 268; Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 27, § 213(b) (3), 44 Stat. 24; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §
22(b)(3), 45 Stat. 798; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 22(b)(3), 48
Stat. 687; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 22(b) (3), 49 Stat. 1657;
Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 22(b) (3), 52 Stat. 458; INT. REv. CODE OF
1939, § 22(b)(3), as amended, ch. 619, § 111(a) (3), 56 Stat. 809 (1942)(now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a)).
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